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 ARTICLES 
A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS: EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, UNRECORDED ADMISSIONS, AND A 
COMPARISON WITH ENGLISH LAW 
Stanley Z. Fisher* and Ian K. McKenzie** 
Introduction 
In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, innocent people have been convicted of crimes, 
imprisoned for long periods, and later exonerated We know this from cases in which 
DNA or other evidence has indisputably shown the innocence of Massachusetts 
prisoners.1[1]  Study of these cases offers a unique opportunity to discover systemic 
weaknesses in our justice system that call for reform This article discusses one case, that 
of Marvin Mitchell, who, in 1997, after a 1990 conviction for child rape, became the first 
Massachusetts prisoner to be exonerated by DNA testing.2[2]  After describing Mitchell’s 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. J.D., Yale University. The author 
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Summer Nastich and the helpful invaluable cooperation of Noah Rosmarin, Esq. 
** Principal Lecturer, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, 
England. Ph.D. (Psychology and Criminal Justice), University of Bath, England. 
Chartered Forensic and Occupational Psychologist, British Psychological Society; 
Former Senior Officer, Metropolitan Police, London. 
1[1]The most recent of these exonerations, in which the prosecution has explicitly 
conceded the prisoner’s factual innocence, involves Shawn Drumgold, who was 
exonerated of murder in November, 2003, after serving 12 years in prison.  See Douglas 
Belkin, Some ask for Mass. innocence panel, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2003 at 
By Douglas Belkin, Globe Staff, 11/11/2003 at XX.  See also the case of Dennis Maher, 
freed on DNA evidence after serving 19 years of a life sentence for multiple rapes See 
Richard Lehr, After 19 Years, DNA Set To Free Rape Convict, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 
2003, at B1 Other recent undisputed exonerations, described in Stanley Z. Fisher, 
Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 
(2002), involved Angel Hernandez, at 16, Donnell Johnson, at 17, Marvin Mitchell,, at 
20, Marlon Passley, at 21, and Eric Sarsfield, at 23. 
2[2]On April 20, 2002, a conference panel entitled A Wrongful Conviction in 
Massachusetts: What Went Wrong? discussed Mitchell’s case. A videotaped recording of 
the discussion [hereinafter “Panel Discussion”] is in the possession of the authors. The 
panel was part of the national conference “Wrongful Convictions: A Call to Action”, 
sponsored by the Harvard Law School’s Institute of Criminal Justice and the New 
case, we focus particularly on two factors that contributed to his wrongful conviction: 
erroneous eyewitness identification and the admission into evidence of a questionable 
unrecorded admission to the police With an eye toward possible needed reforms of the 
procedures followed in Mitchell’s case, we then discuss how the Mitchell case would 
have been treated under English law We do so in the hope that knowledge of another 
system’s approach to common problems might usefully inform our response to the 
miscarriage suffered by Marvin Mitchell and by other innocent victims of the criminal 
justice process 
Factual Background3[3] 
On September 22, 1988, an eleven-year-old Roxbury girl was raped on her way to school 
She described the rapist to her mother in detail, including the facts that he was clean-
shaven, cross-eyed, and wore “pinkish” pants. 4[4]  The victim’s mother reported the 
crime to the police and took the victim to the hospital, where a rape kit was prepared The 
next day, the victim’s mother drove around the neighborhood, spotted Mitchell, and, 
based on her daughter’s description, reported to police her belief that he was the rapist In 
fact, Mitchell’s appearance differed from the victim’s description of her attacker in 
important respects: he was not “clean shaven,” but had a moustache; he was not cross-
eyed; and his pants were not pink, but grey. The police arrested Mitchell for “public 
drinking.”5[5]  At the police station, after the victim selected Mitchell’s photograph from 
two photographic arrays, the police charged him with four counts of forcible rape  In 
                                                                                                                                                 
England Innocence Project. Panel participants included: the authors; Suffolk University 
Law Professor Michael Avery; Associate Justice Isaac Borenstein of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court; San Diego County (Calif.) Deputy District Attorney George “Woody” 
Clarke; and attorneys Margaret Burnham and Noah Rosmarin 
3[3]This factual summary draws, with modifications, from Fisher, supra note 1, at 20. See 
also Mitchell v. City of Boston, 130 F. Supp. 2d 201, 205-07 (D. Mass. 2001) 
[hereinafter “Mitchell II”]. 
4[4]“[The victim] described her assailant as a slim, tall, light-skinned black man in his 
early twenties or late teens with short hair, and a long, narrow, clean-shaven face. She 
also described the assailant as being cross-eyed and wearing pinkish pants and a red and 
white shirt with some sort of emblem on it.” Mitchell II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 205. The 
victim also reported that her attacker had a mole or freckle on the head of his penis. The 
Commonwealth entered photographs of Mitchell’s penis into evidence, but the parties 
disagreed about whether they showed any mole or freckle. Id. at 206 n.4. 
5[5]Mitchell was carrying a partially filled whiskey bottle. The police claimed that he was 
drunk, which he denied. Id. at 205 n.2. 
January 1990, a jury convicted Mitchell.6[6]  He was sentenced to nine to twenty-five 
years in state prison. 
Many factors probably contributed to Mitchell’s wrongful conviction. These include 
factors we do not discuss, such as misleading serological testimony by the 
Commonwealth’s expert witness, contradictory testimony by defense witnesses, and 
errors by defense counsel,  by the prosecutor, and by the appellate court.7[7] We do 
discuss two critically damaging pieces of evidence: the victim’s testimony identifying 
Mitchell as her attacker and testimony by Officer DeMarco,8[8] one of the arresting police 
officers, describing Mitchell’s purported admission during booking at the police station. 
We will address these in turn. 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
The prevalence of mistaken eyewitness identifications and their contribution to wrongful 
convictions is well known.9[9] So too are the suggestive and distorting effects of certain 
law enforcement identification procedures.10[10] The identification procedures used in 
Mitchell included some known to jeopardize reliability. 
                                                 
6[6]In a seemingly compromise verdict (because of doubts about Mitchell’s guilt), the jury 
convicted on one count of forced sexual intercourse and one count of forced unnatural 
sexual intercourse and acquitted on two identical charges. See Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 909, 910 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter “Mitchell I”]. 
7[7]See Panel Discussion, supra note 2. 
8[8]Although both the trial transcript and the Appeals Court opinion refer to Officer 
“DiMarco,” we adopt the spelling “DeMarco,” which was used in the police report and in 
the civil case pleadings and judicial opinion. 
9[9]See, e.g, Steven Penrod, How Well Are Witnesses and Police Performing?, CRIM. 
JUST., Spring 2003, at 37; Gary Wells, et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: 
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 603-609 
(1998) [hereinafter “Eyewitness ID”]. 
10[10]Contrary to popular belief, the idea that a person, once seen, is never forgotten, is 
erroneous. Not only is witness recognition ability adversely affected by the conditions 
(both environmental and physical) in which the initial observation occurs, but also by the 
way in which investigators carry out the procedures intended to provide admissible 
evidence that a suspect (the person in custody) is the same person as the culprit (the 
person who committed the offense). These adverse effects emanate principally from 
inadequate or improper use of ‘fillers’ (the alternative choices of people or photographs 
presented to eyewitnesses) but also include inadequate or improper advice to witnesses 
before they undertake such an identification and practices which ‘bolster’ the witness’s 
belief that she has identified the right person, even though she may be mistaken. See Ian 
The victim identified Mitchell as her attacker at four different points in the proceedings: 
  
·“Mug book” identification: Following Mitchell’s arrest for “public drinking” on the day 
after the crime, the victim selected Mitchell’s photograph from a “mug book” containing 
100 photographs. 
  
·Photographic array: Later on the same day, police showed the victim a collection of 
eight Polaroid photographs, including one just taken of Mitchell She selected his 
photograph. 
  
·Probable cause hearing: Two weeks later, while testifying at a judicial probable cause 
hearing, the victim pointed out the defendant as her attacker.11[11] 
  
Trial: Fifteen months later, in January 1990, the trial took place The victim again 
identified Mitchell from the witness stand.12[12] 
  
The Mitchell identification procedures were potentially suggestive in several respects: 
  
1. Mother’s presence at photographic identification procedures.  Despite the fact that the 
victim’s mother had already decided that Mitchell matched her daughter’s description of 
the rapist, she was permitted to be with her daughter during the two photographic 
                                                                                                                                                 
McKenzie, Psychology and Legal Practice: Fairness and Accuracy in Identification 
Parades, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 200, 200-208. 
11[11]In response to a motion, the court closed the courtroom during the victim’s 
testimony It follows, therefore, that when identified by the victim, Mitchell was seated at 
the defense counsel’s table rather than amongst a group of spectators See Transcript of 
Probable Cause Hearing at 1-2, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 88-9521 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
Oct. 8, 1988) [hereinafter “PCH transcript”]. 
12[12]Transcript of Trial at 1:55, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 072574 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 6, 1989) [hereinafter “Trial transcript]. 
identification procedures conducted at the police station.13[13] Although the mother’s 
presence could provide needed emotional support to the victim, it also posed a risk that 
the mother would wittingly or unwittingly influence her daughter’s selection of 
Mitchell’s photograph. Furthermore, having been the person to whom the victim’s ‘first 
description’ of the culprit had been made and having herself identified Mitchell, she 
became a witness and should have been disqualified from being present at her daughter’s 
identification procedures. Investigators should have dealt with her in isolation from her 
child. In order to deal with the sensitivities of a potentially vulnerable witness, a suitable, 
independent person, preferably of the same sex, should have accompanied the victim. 
  
2. Implication that the photographic arrays contained the rapist’s photograph.  The 
police apparently indicated to the victim that the 100-photo mug book contained a picture 
of her attacker, which she was to pick out.14[14]  This practice can encourage a witness to 
select the photograph which most resembles her mental reconstruction of the memory of 
the perpetrator. This process, called “relative judgment,” increases the risk of mistaken 
identification.15[15] 
  
3. Simultaneous presentation of photographs.   In showing the eight-photo array to the 
victim, the police presented the photographs simultaneously, rather than sequentially The 
                                                 
13[13]Others present included sexual assault unit detectives and a police captain. 
Testimony of Detective Flynn, Id. at 2:46. 
14[14]According to the victim, “[t]hey told [me] that they were going to give me a book 
with a bunch of pictures and I was to pick out the guy who raped me.” Id. at 1:69. 
15[15]See Wells, Eyewitness ID, supra note 9, at 613-617. The victim’s testimony suggests 
a classic resort to “relative judgment.” “I think it was the second page [of the mug book], 
I stopped and I paused and I looked at his picture and I said I’ll go on for a while just to 
see if I see anything else And I didn’t see anyone and I came back and told them it was 
him.” PCH transcript, supra note 11, at 17. The victim viewed every picture in the mug 
book, in which pictures which were presented eight to a page. This is a strange hybrid of 
the simultaneous/sequential dichotomy. Each page of the book contained a group of 
photos that could be compared to each other. Thus, the method of presentation of each 
page allows the witness to view multiple photos at the same time and compare them with 
each other, and seems to invite the “relative judgment” discussed above. Between groups, 
however, (as the pages are turned), the process becomes more, although not completely, 
sequential. We are aware of no research that addresses this problematic situation. 
simultaneous method also encourages an identification witness to make unreliable 
“relative judgments.”16[16] 
  
4. Reinforcement of the victim’s identification of Mitchell.   When the victim selected 
Mitchell’s photograph from the mug book, the police responded by saying “good.”17[17]  
Such post-identification feedback has been shown to increase a witness’s confidence in 
his or her erroneous identification, and to distort her memory of the event.18[18] In 
Mitchell, it appears the victim later recalled being more confident of her mug-book 
identification than she indicated at the time she made it.19[19] 
  
5. Repeated showing of Mitchell’s photograph in successive arrays.   Following the 
victim’s selection of Mitchell’s photograph from the mug book, she was asked to view a 
second group of eight Polaroid photographs, which included a new photograph of 
Mitchell This second showing of Mitchell’s photograph might be viewed as 
suggestive.20[20]  
                                                 
16[16]See Wells, Eyewitness ID, supra note 9, at 613-617. 
17[17]Testimony of victim, Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 1:70. 
18[18]See Gary L. Wells, et al., Distorted Retrospective Eyewitness Reports as Functions 
of Feedback and Delay, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 42, 42 (2003) (showing 
that feedback distorts “eyewitnesses’  recalled confidence, amount of attention paid 
during witnessing, goodness of view, ability to make out facial details, length of time to 
identification, and other measures related to the witnessing experience.”). Giving 
confirmatory feedback is known in psychological texts as “bolstering.” To eliminate the 
risk of such feedback, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved procedures in 
which “police officers conducting the identification procedure do not possess information 
about the defendant and make ‘no gestures or comments concerning any set of 
photographs.’” See Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 307, 312 (2001). In 
the psychological literature, this is known as a ‘double blind’ procedure. However, the 
Court’s “approval” does not seem to create a binding requirement on the police. 
19[19]According to her trial testimony, the victim told police “this [is] the man who raped 
me.” Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 1:70. But the police detective who administered 
the mug book procedure testified that she said “That looks like the man that assaulted 
me.” Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 2:47. This latter verbalization is, of course, not 
evidence of an identification, but evidence of a qualified opinion. 
20[20]But see ERIC BLUMENSON ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE § 18.3c n.67 
(3d. ed. 2003) (no due process violation to show defendant’s photograph a second time in 
  
6. Identifications made by the victim in court. Despite the apparent legitimacy of in-court 
identifications by a victim, in Massachusetts such identifications may be considered low 
quality at best In the courtroom, the victim has an obvious choice in the defendant. A 
line-up or group identification would be more effective.  At worst, such identifications 
unduly affect jurors,21[22] who are impressed by a theatrical device that has little 
legitimacy in the context of providing evidence that a suspect is the culprit.22[23]  This 
will be discussed further below. 
The trial court denied a pretrial defense motion to suppress the victim’s identification of 
Mitchell.  This ruling was not attacked on appeal.23[21] 
 
  
Treatment of the Identification Evidence Under English Law 
Following Supreme Court precedents from the Warren era, Massachusetts courts exclude 
eyewitness identification evidence on due process grounds if the identification stems 
from a procedure that was “unnecessarily suggestive.”24[24]  Even though the 
Massachusetts highest court recently “approved” specific enlightened procedures for 
                                                                                                                                                 
a subsequent array after having been selected, citing cases). The defense in Mitchell also 
claimed that  “the dissimilarity of the other photos [in the photo array] likely  influenced 
the [victim’s] selection of Mitchell.” Mitchell II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 206 n.3. 
21[22]See Elizabeth Loftus, What Jennifer Saw, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/loftus.html. 
22[23]In fact, the notion that identification procedures are intended to provide evidence 
that a suspect is the culprit is at the core of psychological debate and discussion Far too 
often, identification procedures are seen and used by the police to demonstrate that they 
have or appear to have the right person This is not the same thing at all. 
23[21]On appeal, the defense claimed error only regarding admission of Mitchell’s 
purported statement at the police station. Mitchell I, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 909. 
24[24]Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Commonwealth v. Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 
866-868 (1976). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to follow the 
Supreme Court’s narrowing decision in Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458 (1995); see generally, BLUMENSON, supra 
note 20, at § 18.3A. 
conducting eyewitness identification procedures,25[25] trial courts enjoy wide discretion in 
deciding the admissibility of identification evidence produced by procedures such as 
those employed by the police in Mitchell. 
English law takes a different approach. At the heart of what is usually defined as a crime 
control model of criminal justice,26[26] is a due process core of singular rigidity, affecting 
most aspects of custodial investigation including, but not limited to identification 
procedures. 
For ease of presentation the issues noted at points 1-6 above will be dealt with in two 
sections: a) Custodial/investigative identification procedures (points 1-5) and b) 
Courtroom identification procedures (point 6). 
a. Custodial identification procedures 
 Since as long ago as 1969,27[27] identification procedures, both using ‘line-
ups’28[28] and photographs, have been the subject of judicial guidance, case law 
(requiring compliance), and, since 1984,29[29] of codes of practice These codes carry with 
them an expectation that breaches will almost certainly result in cases being lost and may 
result in disciplinary action against officers who breach them.30[30] The latest edition of 
                                                 
25[25]See Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 307, 312 (2001), (endorsing, 
inter alia, double-blind procedures and citing with approval NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 
1999)). 
26[26]HERBERT L. PACKARD, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 149-246 (Stanford 
University Press 1968). 
27[27]In fact, although the commonly cited starting point for examination of these 
procedural documents is HOME OFFICE, CIRCULAR ON ID PARADES (1969), it is possible 
to trace the source of that document to Home Office circulars issued in 1905, 1925 and 
1926. See id. at preamble. 
28[28]Commonly referred to as identification (or ID) parades in England. The expression 
line-up is rarely used. 
29[29]The codes of practice are made under the aegis of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 1984 (Eng.) The relevant code for the purposes of 
this article is HOME OFFICE, Code D, in CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
PERSONS BY POLICE OFFICERS (2003) [hereinafter “Code D”]. 
30[30]See Ian McKenzie, Eyewitness Evidence: Will the United States Guide for Law 
Enforcement Make Any Difference?, 7 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF, 237, 237-263 (2003) 
(regarding the power of such sanctions and likely efficacy of the Guidelines in the United 
States) 
the Code of Practice on Identification31[31] came into force in April 2003. Apart from 
minor changes in the wording of the requirements, the directions contained in the new 
edition echo those that have existed for many years.32[32] 
Importantly, in the context of comparison with Mitchell, in England and Wales 
photographs may only be used when there is, as yet, no identified suspect. Code D 
paragraph 3.3, reads in part: 
A witness must not be shown photographs, computerised or artist’s composite likenesses 
or similar likenesses or pictures (including ‘E-fit’ images) if the identity of the suspect is 
known to the police and the suspect is available to take part in a video identification, an 
identification parade or a group identification.33[33] 
Although it is not mandatory when using photographs, it is anticipated that an 
independent person not involved with the investigation, normally a police officer, but 
possibly a civilian employee of the police, will conduct identification procedures. In 
identification parades (line-ups), this person must be an Inspector (equivalent to the rank 
of Lieutenant in American policing), but when conducting IDs using photographs, may 
be an officer of ‘sergeant rank or above.’34[34] In theory, this allows any sergeant to 
undertake photo identification procedures; however, in practice, most police stations in 
England and Wales would have one or more specially trained sergeants, working within 
the auspices of a specially designed and managed identification suite, to undertake such 
work. 
This supervisory officer must confirm that the first description of the suspect given by the 
witness has been recorded before that person is shown photographs. A first description 
appears to have been received by the police in Mitchell’s case but it is unclear how it was 
actually recorded.35[35] Sufficient importance is given to the need for accurate recording 
of the first description that the Codes of Practice says, “[i]f the supervisory officer is 
unable to confirm [that] the description has been recorded they [sic] shall postpone 
showing the photographs.”36[36] 
                                                 
31[31]Code D, supra note 29. 
32[32]See PACKARD, supra note 26. 
33[33]Code D, supra note 29, at ¶ 3.3. 
34[34]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex E ¶ 1. 
35[35]See Mitchell I, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
36[36]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex E ¶ 2. 
The rules require that only one witness shall be shown photographs at any one time. Each 
witness shall be given as much privacy as practicable and shall not be allowed to 
communicate with any other witness in the case.37[37] 
Instructions require that the witness shall be shown no fewer than twelve photographs at a 
time, which shall as far as possible be of a similar type The loose wording of this 
paragraph is unusual and unfortunate Although witnesses are generally shown twelve 
photographs, the leeway for showing dozens, perhaps even hundreds, is clear.38[38] 
In addition, the system in England is, categorically, one of simultaneous presentation: the 
expression ‘at one time’ is taken to mean just that—all twelve photographs appear on one 
page of the book or in one frame. As noted above, psychologists have repeatedly shown 
through experimental studies that greater identification accuracy is achieved where a 
sequential methodology is used, in contrast to a simultaneous methodology. In this case, 
it is easy to argue that English Codes of Practice should be adjusted to reflect 
psychological realities. 
The English Codes of Practice do require that “as far as possible,” all photographs shall 
be of a similar type.  Experimental studies by psychologists have repeatedly suggested 
that the fairest way to conduct such photo IDs is to present photographs which are all of 
the same size, the same kind of visual image, and feature similar, if not identical 
backgrounds.39[39]  In England and Wales, photo books are constructed in such a manner. 
The Turnbull rules 
In 1977, following a string of miscarriages of justice based on erroneous identification, a 
judicial inquiry was established under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin, one of England’s 
senior judges.40[40]  As a consequence, Lord Devlin was much concerned about the 
                                                 
37[37]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex E ¶ 3. In Mitchell’s case, privacy seems to have 
been in short supply at the victim’s first photo ID session. Trial transcript, supra note 12, 
at 2:46. 
38[38]Such a course of action might easily be deliberately used to confuse a witness if, for 
example, a police officer or other public figure were accused of a crime. That is, the void 
of insufficient specificity might be occupied by corruption Indeed, in the Mitchell case, 
for these and other reasons, the use of the 100-photograph mug book was unfortunate. 
See Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 1:69; PCH transcript, supra note 11, at 17. 
39[39]See ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 88-109 (1979). 
40[40]See LORD DEVLIN, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN 
CRIMINAL CASES (1979). 
possibility of relative judgments being made during identification procedures, and among 
many other recommendations, noted that: 
We have been impressed with the evidence from psychologists which suggests that 
witnesses may tend . . . to make an identification on parade because they feel that is what 
is expected of them We have considered various ways of relieving the pressure on 
witnesses of this type and conclude that the best way is to tell the witness expressly that 
the person he saw may not be on the parade We recommend that this should be done 
when the officer addresses the witness just before he inspects the parade.41[41] 
There was some delay in implementing Devlin’s recommendations, but in 1977 a 
specially constituted court of appeal42[42] of exceptional strength endorsed the 
recommendations in Regina v. Turnbull,43[43] ensuring that the relative judgment problem 
was addressed The court also reiterated, in substantial measure, the content of Devlin’s 
recommendation requiring that the officer running the parade should tell each witness 
that “the person he saw may or may not be in the parade and [that] if he cannot make a 
positive identification he should say so.”44[44] Although this recommendation seems to 
relate specifically to identification parades (line-ups), the same requirement was inserted 
in the first edition of the Codes of Practice in relation to the use of photographs. 
The current requirement reads as follows: 
When the witness is shown the photographs, they [sic] shall be told [that] the photograph 
of a person they saw may, or may not, be amongst them and if they [sic] cannot make a 
positive identification, they [sic] should say so The witness shall also be told [that] they 
[sic] should not make a decision until they [sic] have viewed at least 12 photographs.  
The witness shall not be prompted or guided in any way, but shall be left to make any 
selection without help. 45[45] 
Finally, it is important to point out that although ‘bolstering’ is currently not prohibited in 
England and Wales, the existence of the problem has been identified and might well 
become a key subject in cross examination of witnesses to the identification processes. 
Comprehensive records are required to be kept of “anything said by the witness about any 
                                                 
41[41]Id. at 154 ¶ 8.16. A similar recommendation, made for similar reasons, is embedded 
in the new federal guidelines [IS THIS THE US GUIDELINES OR CODE D?] 
42[42]Court of Appeal decisions are binding on all subsidiary courts under English law. 
43[43]Regina v. Turnbull, [1977] 1 Q.B. 224 (Eng. C.A.). 
44[44]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex A ¶14. 
45[45]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex A ¶14. 
identification, or the conduct of the procedure”46[46] and “[n]one of the photographs shall 
be destroyed, whether or not an identification is made, since they may be required for 
production in court The photographs shall be numbered and a separate photograph taken 
of the frame or part of the album from which the witness made the identification. . .”47[47] 
After the identification procedure  
If a witness makes a positive identification from photographs, unless the person identified 
has already been eliminated from inquiries or is not available, i.e. has not been arrested, 
the requirement is specific and unequivocal: other witnesses shall not be shown 
photographs.  Both other witnesses, and the witness who has made the identification, 
shall be asked to attend a video identification, an identification parade, or group 
identification, unless there is no dispute about the suspect’s identity.48[48] 
If a witness makes a selection from photographs but is unable to confirm the 
identification (e.g. by saying something like “I think that’s the person,” or “that looks like 
him”49[49]), the officer conducting the process shall ask that person how sure he or she is 
that the photograph identified is that of the person seen in the commission of a crime or 
other incident.50[50] 
It is beyond dispute that a second showing of photographs to a witness, however much 
the photographs differ from those previously used, would be considered a breach of the 
Code of Practice, for the expectation clearly is that once an identification using 
photographs51[51] has taken place, both the identifying witness and any other 
eyewitnesses capable of making such an identification must be exposed to one of the 
other available processes of identification.52[52] 
                                                 
46[46]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex A ¶ 11. 
47[47]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex A ¶ 10. 
48[48]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex A ¶ 6. 
49[49]See supra note 19. 
50[50]Code D, supra note 29, at Annex E ¶ 7. 
51[51]Or computerized images, artist’s composite drawings, or other  similar likenesses, 
which, as with photographs, may not be shown to other witnesses. Code D, supra note 
29, at Annex E ¶ 8. 
52[52]It may be that this practice is not considered a breach of due process in 
Massachusetts, see BLUMENSON, supra note 20, but it is surely unsound from a 
psychological standpoint. In addition, the defense claim that the dissimilarity in the 
Thus, in the Mitchell case, there are a number of circumstances which, if the 
investigation had been conducted in England or Wales, would have run afoul of the 
requirements of the Code of Practice. These are: the presence of the victim’s mother at 
the initial identification; the showing of a second set of pictures to the victim; and the 
failure adequately to ensure that the witness was properly advised that a picture of the 
culprit might not be among the photographs shown to her. It is entirely possible that such 
serious improprieties would, in England and Wales, result in a decision by the Crown 
Prosecution Service53[53] to discontinue the case. How such breaches might be dealt with 
in the unlikely event that a prosecution had followed is considered below 
  
b) Courtroom identification procedures 
Until recently, the law in England and Wales on what are known as “dock 
identifications” was clearly defined. In a passage based upon the cases of Regina v. 
Cartwright54[54] and Regina v. Fergus,55[55] Archbold states that dock identifications have 
“long been regarded as undesirable,” and that “[it] is now difficult to conceive of 
circumstances in which a trial judge would permit either a dock identification or evidence 
of a dock identification to be adduced.”56[56] 
However, in the case of Barnes,57[57] an appeal against conviction was made on the 
grounds that a dock identification, which had taken place in a Magistrate’s Court,58[58] 
                                                                                                                                                 
Polaroid images had an adverse effect is supported by the psychological literature and 
would, in itself, have been a breach of the English Code of Practice. 
53[53]In role, the approximate equivalent of the District Attorney’s office. The Crown 
Prosecution Service is national in its jurisdiction. All legal staff are appointed by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who is in turn appointed by the Attorney-General, 
and in whose name most criminal prosecutions are brought. None of these posts depend 
on electoral approval. 
54[54]10 Crim. App. R. 219 (1914) (Eng. Crim. App.). 
55[55]98 Crim. App. R. 313 (1994) (Eng. C.A.). 
56[56]ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE ¶ 14-42 (2002 ed.) (a key 
work of judicial commentary). 
57[57]Barnes v. Chief Constable of Durham, 2 Crim. App. R. 505 (1997). 
58[58]The court of first instance and of summary jurisdiction; any trial in this court is 
before a bench of magistrates. In most cases, there are three magistrates who are “lay” 
persons - in other words, they are neither professional judges nor lawyers, but, like a jury, 
are persons from the local community. However, there are now an increasing number of 
was improper and should be excluded In giving his judgment upholding the conviction, 
Judge Popplewell referred to the above passage and, clearly seizing on the words “trial 
judge,” made a distinction between the Crown Court and the Magistrate’s Court:59[59] 
The passage in Archbold may properly represent the law as it applies to the Crown Court 
but has singularly little application to the everyday activities of the magistrate’s court. . . 
there is no logic in making a distinction in regard to dock identifications between the 
Crown Court and the magistrate’s court However it has to be recognised that every day in 
a magistrate’s court those charged for instance with careless driving, who made no 
statement to the police, are entitled to sit back and in the absence of identification to 
submit that it has not been proven that they were the driver. . . if in every case where the 
defendant does not distinctly admit driving there has to be a identification parade, the 
whole process of justice in a magistrate’s court would be severely impaired.60[60] 
Thus, it seems, that dock identifications are disapproved of as a legitimate form of 
evidence when they take place in the Crown Court, but may be permitted at the 
magistrate’s court. However, it has recently been strongly argued that there is neither 
logical nor legal justification for drawing a distinction as to the standard of admissible 
identification evidence between summary (minor) and indictable (serious) offences.61[61] 
Furthermore, a close reading of existing case law suggests that, in either of the courts, 
dock identification would be held inadmissible if the police had undertaken previous 
identification efforts, i.e., that admissible evidence already exists that the defendant may 
legitimately be considered the culprit. 
The import for Mitchell is clear Were the case in England, the dock identification on the 
occasion of the formal trial would have been improper. It is also very likely that, in view 
of the circumstances surrounding the investigation of the case (i.e. prior evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“stipendiary” magistrates - paid magistrates who are qualified lawyers, now known as 
District Judges. All cases, however serious, are first heard in or processed through the 
Magistrate’s Court. In serious cases, which will be heard on indictment in the Crown 
Court (see infra note 60), the purpose of the hearing (called a committal) is to establish 
whether there is a prima facie case to answer. Although the analogy is wanting in some 
respects, there is sufficient justification for considering a Magistrates Court as analogous 
to a court in the United States conducting a probable cause hearing. 
59[59]If, following committal proceedings, the case proceeds, it is heard in a Crown Court. 
The trial is before a judge and jury. The judge presides over the trial process by 
attempting to ensure clarity and fairness. 
60[60]Barnes, 2 Crim. App. R., at 510 
61[61]See Tony Watkin, In the Dock - An Overview of the Decisions of the High Court on 
Identifications in the Magistrate’s Court, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 463, 463-467. The matter 
may be more confusing with the introduction of District Judges. See supra note 59. 
identification), impropriety would exist with regard to the identification at the probable 
cause hearing. 
The issue here is one of fairness, a notion firmly embedded in the ethos and requirements 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, which, as we shall see, is central to the 
issue of the ‘interview’ allegedly adducing the “pink pants” testimony. 
  
Admissibility Of “Pink Pants” Testimony 
Police testified at trial that during the booking process, Mitchell said he had worn pink 
pants on the day of the crime In a civil suit brought after Mitchell was released from 
prison, he claimed that this testimony was false.62[62] 
The victim’s original description of her assailant included the fact that he had been 
wearing “pinkish jeans.”  On the day after the crime, when Mitchell was arrested and 
booked by Officers Trent Holland and Robin DeMarco, he was wearing grey pants 
Although the officers later claimed that Mitchell had admitted to wearing “pink pants” on 
the previous day, “[n]either officer noted Mitchell’s supposed incriminating statement in 
an incident report, as would be required by police procedures, [nor] reported the alleged 
statement to the Sexual Assault Unit, as required by police policy Indeed, no mention of 
Mitchell’s alleged statement was made by either officer for well over a year.”63[63] 
Ignorant of any statement to police by the defendant, the prosecutor failed to disclose any 
when so requested in pretrial discovery.64[64] Mitchell’s purported statement first came to 
light in December 1989, fifteen months after the crime, and only one month before trial 
In a letter to Mitchell’s lawyer, the prosecutor wrote: 
                                                 
62[62]Mitchell II, 130 F.Supp. 2d at 205. 
63[63]Id Ignorant of Mitchell’s alleged admission, the Sexual Assault Unit detectives 
never applied for a warrant to search Mitchell’s home for the pink pants. Although 
Massachusetts courts treat police failure to record a defendant’s admission or confession 
as relevant to whether any statement was made, the law does not require recording of 
either interrogation of suspects or their confessions. See BLUMENSON, supra note 20, at § 
19.3A n.8. But see H.B. 749, 183d Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2003) and S.B. 988, 183d Gen. Ct. 
(Mass. 2003) (requiring, if enacted, the electronic recording of custodial  interrogations 
of suspects). 
64[64]Although defense counsel’s discovery request asked only for “written or recorded 
statements made by the defendant in the possession, custody or control of the 
prosecutor,” the prosecution was bound by case law to turn over any oral statements by 
the defendant as well. See ERIC BLUMENSON, supra note 20, at § 16.6C n.247. 
I should . . . inform you that on December 18 I spoke with Trent Holland, the officer who 
arrested your client The officer recalled asking Mitchell at the booking desk what 
clothing Mitchell had worn on the previous day Mitchell responded that he had been 
wearing “pinkish” pants The officer recalls that other statements were made as well and 
feels that seeing the defendant will refresh his recollection.65[65] 
When Holland took the stand at trial to testify to Mitchell’s admission, the court granted a 
defense motion to hold a voir dire on the statement’s admissibility At its conclusion, the 
judge indicated his likely intention to exclude Holland’s testimony regarding the 
statement . By questioning Mitchell about his dress on the previous day, Holland had 
subjected Mitchell to “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, but failed to obtain 
Mitchell’s express waiver of Miranda rights.66[66] The prosecutor argued that the law did 
not require an express waiver.   Toto give the prosecutor time to find authority for her 
position,67[67] the court granted her request to adjourn the proceedings until the next 
morning. 
The next day, however, the prosecutor withdrew Holland’s testimony and presented a 
new witness to Mitchell’s purported statement: Holland’s partner, DeMarco.   DeMarco, 
who had not been subpoenaed or listed as a prosecution witness, testified to hearing 
Mitchell’s “pink pants” statement at the booking desk. DeMarco’s version of the event 
differed from Holland’s. According to DeMarco, Mitchell spontaneously injected himself 
into a conversation between DeMarco and one Lieutenant Cunningham during Mitchell’s 
booking In discussing a description of a wanted person given out in the morning roll call, 
DeMarco stated at trial that she told the Lieutenant that “usually . . . people wear the 
same clothes every day.” DeMarco claimed that the defendant then spontaneously 
interjected, “I didn’t have these clothes on yesterday . . . I had pink pants on.”68[68] 
DeMarco’s eleventh hour revelation (which, like Holland’s, had not previously been 
recorded or communicated to anyone) contradicted the prosecutor’s letter to defense 
counsel reporting Holland’s version of the same event.69[69]  But it solved two problems 
                                                 
65[65]Letter from Assistant Suffolk County (Mass.) District Attorney Leslie W. O’Brien to 
Attorney Jonathan Brant, Dec. 22, 1989 [hereinafter “O’Brien Letter”] (on file with B.U. 
Public Interest Law Journal). Holland never testified to any other purported statements by 
Mitchell. 
66[66]See Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969). 
67[67]The prosecutor was apparently right A suspect in custody who speaks after being 
given Miranda warnings, and affirming that he understands them is considered to have 
implicitly waived his rights. See BLUMENSON, supra note 20, at § 19.4D(2)(c). 
68[68]Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 2:8. 
69[69]See supra text accompanying note 65. In his voir dire testimony at trial, Holland 
claimed that he did not ask Mitchell about his clothing on the previous day, and that 
for the prosecution First, because in DeMarco’s version of events, Mitchell’s statement 
was a “spontaneous declaration” rather than a “response to interrogation,” it was exempt 
from the strictures of Miranda Second, the prosecution avoided having to put Holland on 
the witness stand on the very day when “two local newspapers published articles 
reporting that Holland . . . was cited in a recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision for 
having possibly committed perjury.”70[70] 
Over defense objection, DeMarco was permitted to testify to hearing Mitchell’s “pink 
pants” statement  Defense counsel argued to the jury that DeMarco’s testimony was not 
credible;71[71] the judge instructed the jury that they could not consider the statement 
unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that it had been made.72[72] The jury 
convicted Mitchell on two of the four charges brought against him Endorsing the trial 
court’s finding that Mitchell’s “pink pants” statement was “spontaneous” rather than the 
“product of interrogation,” the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed.73[73]  The Court 
also rejected defense arguments for reversal based on late notice of Mitchell’s alleged 
statement and the surprise substitution of DeMarco for Holland as a witness 
After Mitchell’s DNA exoneration in 1997, he filed civil rights claims against the City of 
Boston and against Holland and DeMarco individually The second count of his 
complaint, alleging that Holland conspired with DeMarco to convict him by giving 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mitchell had volunteered the “pink pants” statement in the course of routine booking 
questions. Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 1:143. Questioned by the court about the 
contradiction between DeMarco’s testimony and the prosecutor’s letter to defense 
counsel, see O’Brien Letter, supra note 67, the prosecutor explained that in her letter, she 
had wrongly assumed that Holland had questioned Mitchell about his clothing. In fact, 
she did not recall Holland saying so. Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 2:16-2:17 The trial 
judge, however, assumed at the conclusion of Holland’s voir dire that “somebody” had 
asked Mitchell what he was wearing. Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 1:146-1:147. 
70[70]Mitchell II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 207. Holland’s reputation for dishonesty was 
apparently widely known to the trial bar and bench in Suffolk County. Panel Discussion, 
remarks of attorney Burnham and Judge Borenstein; Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 42, 
Mitchell II (No. 98-3693) (claiming, on information and belief, that Holland “had been 
accused of misconduct on eighteen occasions in connection with his duties as a police 
officer, but had not been disciplined for the this misconduct.”) 
71[71]Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 2:126. 
72[72]Trial transcript, supra note 12, at 2:155-2:156. 
73[73]Mitchell I, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 910. 
perjured testimony, survived Holland’s motion for summary judgment.74[74] The City 
paid Mitchell $450,000 to settle the suit.75[75] 
Treatment of the “Pink Pants” Statement Under English Law 
Under Massachusetts law, neither the fact that Mitchell’s purported statement was 
unrecorded, nor its late disclosure, required the trial court to treat the statement any 
differently than it did Failure to record the statement was relevant only to the officer’s 
credibility, and credibility is a matter for the jury The prosecution’s failure to make 
timely disclosure to the defense entitles a defendant only to a continuance, if necessary, 
to prepare for trial in light of the newly disclosed evidence.76[76] 
English law takes a different approach, for, as with issues in connection with 
identification, a Code of Practice (Code C), made under the provisions of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, governs a wide range of matters associated with the 
detention, treatment and interviewing of persons in custody.77[77]  As with Code D, 
discussed above, Code C was structured and developed to deal with many aspects of 
police practice and procedure that have been shown to lead to miscarriages of justice. 
Although not exclusively so, many of these practices relate to aspects of police 
interviewing (interrogation) of suspects.78[78] The Code of Practice is designed to inhibit 
improper and coercive interviewing and to ensure that a suspect is dealt with in an ethical 
and principled manner. 
Detention, unsolicited remarks, and interviews 
In England and Wales, any person in custody and taken into a police station under arrest 
immediately falls under the general supervision of the custody officer.79[79] He or she is 
an authorized and specially trained police officer of sergeant rank (or a civilian employee 
of the police of similar standing and training) charged with general supervision of the 
                                                 
74[74]Mitchell II, 130 F.Supp. 2d at 201. 
75[75]Fisher, supra note 1, at 20. 
76[76]See BLUMENSON, supra note 20, at § 16.4B. 
77[77]HOME OFFICE, Code C, in CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS 
BY POLICE OFFICERS (2003) [hereinafter “Code C”]. 
78[78]See Ian McKenzie, Forensic Investigative Interviewing, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERVIEW RESEARCH: CONTEXT AND METHOD (Jaber Gubrium & James Holstein eds., 
2003) 
79[79]Code C, supra note 77, at ¶ 1.11. 
propriety of the detention and with the maintenance of a Custody Record.80[80] The 
Custody Record is an official document and its completion is mandatory. It is used for 
recording all matters in connection with the management of each detained person; these 
include arrival, circumstances of arrest, periods out of the cells including periods of 
interview (which are themselves closely controlled),81[81] meal times, visits, and a range 
of other matters. The detained person is required to sign the custody record to 
acknowledge certain events, such as being told of the right to legal assistance, the right to 
have someone informed of her arrest, the right to consult the Code of Practice.82[82] 
Detained persons are given documents outlining all of the above and reiterating the 
‘caution,’ a form of words loosely approximating the Miranda warning 
The custody officer must decide whether or not to authorize detention and will do so after 
hearing a brief account of the circumstances given by the arresting officer. The custody 
officer must record any response by the detained person and may not ask any questions. 
However, the codes require that any officer present (including the Custody Officer) must 
record any unsolicited remarks made by the detained person. Paragraph 11.13 of Code C 
reads: 
A written record shall be made of any comments made by a suspect, including unsolicited 
comments, which are outside the context of an interview but might be relevant to the 
offense. Any such record must be timed and signed by the maker. When practicable, the 
suspect shall be given the opportunity to read that record and to sign it as correct or to 
indicate how they consider it inaccurate. 83[83] 
Furthermore, Code C requires that: 
At the beginning of an interview the interviewer, after cautioning the suspect, shall put to 
them any significant statement or silence which occurred in the presence and hearing of a 
police officer or civilian interviewer before the start of the interview and which have not 
been put to the suspect in the course of a previous interview The interviewer shall ask the 
suspect whether they confirm or deny that earlier statement or silence and if they want to 
add anything. 
A significant statement is one which appears capable of being used in evidence against 
the suspect, in particular a direct admission of guilt. 84[84] 
                                                 
80[80]Code C, supra note 77, at ¶ 2.1. 
81[81]See McKenzie, supra note 78. 
82[82]Code C, supra note 77, at ¶ 3.1. 
83[83]Code C, supra note 77. 
84[84]Code C, supra note 77, at ¶¶ 11.4, 11.4A. 
It is not clear whether Mitchell was ever formally interviewed, but even if he was not, in 
English law, the ‘spontaneous’ pink pants statement would have been required to be 
recorded. 
In addition to the foregoing, English case law has defined an “interview” as any 
discussion between a suspect and a prisoner about an alleged crime, whether instigated by 
the suspect or a police officer. 85[85]  Despite the apparent clarity of this definition, the 
case law in England in this respect is complex.86[86] Regardless of whether the pink pants 
statements were part of what could be defined as an interview or were unsolicited 
comments relevant to the offence, they should have been recorded for formal presentation 
in evidence This conclusion is based on a close examination of English cases as they 
might apply to the circumstances of Mitchell In either case, failure to record the 
statements would have been a breach of the Code of Practice, the effect of which is 
discussed below. 
What would have happened in Court? 
On the assumption that the problematic identification(s) did not lead to the case being 
discontinued by the Crown Prosecution Service, what would have happened when the 
case came to trial? 
Admissibility issues. 
If evidence in a criminal or civil court has been obtained in circumstances that amount to 
a breach of the codes, what is the result? Does English law provide some sanction?  
Although in English law there is no equivalent of the American doctrine of “due 
process,” by which any evidence not obtained by proper procedures may be rendered 
inadmissible, the courts in England and Wales can exclude evidence under certain 
circumstances. 
First, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights specifies that those taken 
into custody and charged with offences have the right to a fair trial. 87[87]  The contents of 
the European Convention are embedded in domestic law through the provisions of the 
Human Rights Act of 1998 This legislation requires that such matters be considered in all 
courts, including the magistrates’ courts. This forms the underpinning of a number of 
imperatives existing in English common and statute law. 
                                                 
85[85]Regina v. Matthews, 91 Cr. App. R. 43 (1990). 
86[86]See Rolo Jerrard, Interview? Police Question to Publican Amounted to Interview, 
http://ourworld.cs.com/RJer340036/law/cases/batley.htm. 
87[87]European Convention on Human Rights, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 6-7 (Martinus Nijhoff 1997). 
Second, English common law provides that a judge has discretion as to whether presented 
evidence is admissible Under this common law provision, the issue is what effect the 
evidence will have at trial The court can exclude evidence at common law where the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence on the defendant greatly outweighs its probative 
value.88[88] 
Third, section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 provides that in any 
case where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession and where such a 
confession may be said to have been made as a consequence of anything said or done 
which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render it unreliable, the 
court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence, unless the prosecution is able 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances of the confession would not 
render it unreliable A successful submission under section 76 does not require a breach of 
a Code of Practice.89[89] However, if a Code of Practice is breached, any argument 
seeking to exclude confession evidence is necessarily strengthened. 
Finally, the most powerful sanction under the codes concerned with the handling of 
suspects is contained in Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Under 
Section 78, a judge can rule evidence inadmissible on the grounds of unfairness. Under 
this provision, the court may refuse to allow evidence if, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the admission of the evidence would have such a prejudicial effect as to 
result in an injustice. 
Section 78 is broader than section 76 and applies to all evidence that the prosecution 
intends to produce in court Case law has repeatedly suggested that compliance with the 
Codes of Practice is vital Such cases have suggested that where steps required by the 
codes were not observed and where such material was entered into evidence without 
those checks there was a real risk to the fairness of the proceedings.90[90]  In addition, 
case law has suggested that it is undesirable to attempt any general guidance as to the 
way in which a judge’s discretion under section 78 should be exercised It is a question of 
fact in each case.91[91]  While section 76 requires specific links between the treatment of a 
person in custody and the making of the unreliable confession, the only issue under 
section 78 is the question of whether it would be unfair to admit the evidence in court 
                                                 
88[88]See Regina. v. Sang, [1980] A.C. 402 (1979). 
89[89]Regina. v. Walker, [1998] Crim L.R. 211 (Eng. C.A. 1997). 
90[90]Batley v. DPP, The Times, Mar. 5, 1998 (Q.B. 1998). In addition, Batley confirms 
the need for records to be kept of such interviews and indicates that even if circumstances 
at the time preclude it, the witness should be asked to endorse the accuracy of the record, 
“the following day or at any stage after the event had taken place.” See also supra text 
accompanying note 83. 
91[91]Regina v. Samuel, [1988] 1 Q.B. 615 (Eng. C.A.). 
Outcome 
On the facts of Mitchell it seems inevitable that in England and Wales the pink pants 
testimony would have been excluded. The police’s behavior would likely have been the 
subject of adverse comment by an English judge who may also have seen fit to question 
the propriety and ethics of the prosecution on the grounds of serious breaches of Code C 
of the Codes of Practice Similarly, on the grounds of unfairness, the identification 
evidence would likely have been excluded  Breaches of Code D of the Codes of Practice 
play a large part in that decision. In short, it is unlikely that Marvin Mitchell would even 
have been prosecuted in England, let alone convicted, for the crime for which he spent 
seven years in a Massachusetts prison. 
Conclusion 
Some jurisdictions have instituted reforms in light of the heightened awareness in the 
United States of the tragic results of unreliable eyewitness identification procedures.92[92]  
States are also considering reforms in police interrogation procedures These procedures 
have come under scrutiny93[93] as a result of well-publicized exonerations of prisoners 
convicted on dubious “confession” testimony.94[94] Massachusetts has also  known 
wrongful convictions influenced by faulty identification procedures—mistaken 
eyewitness testimony has been a factor in over half of the known wrongful convictions in 
the state.95[95]  Finally, eleventh hour revelations of defendants’ incriminating statements 
or conduct have appeared in Massachusetts’ wrongful convictions with disturbing 
frequency.96[96]  In light of these developments, Massachusetts should consider adopting 
                                                 
92[92]See INNOCENCE PROJECT, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, MISTAKEN 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS: A RESOURCE GUIDE 185-203 (2003) (running list of 
jurisdictions practicing sequential line-ups and double blind procedures). 
93[93]Illinois recently adopted a requirement that the police tape interrogations and 
confessions in murder cases. Associated Press, Part of Death Penalty Reform is Vetoed, 
July 29, 2003. In the first half of 2003, bills requiring the police to record interrogations 
were introduced in fourteen other states. Communication to author from Mary Schmid, 
National Affairs Assistant, National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, July 15, 2003. 
94[94]See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Why Confess to What You Didn’t Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2002, Sec. 4, at 5 (discussing exoneration of five youths convicted in the “Central Park 
Jogger” attack of 1989). 
95[95]Fisher, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
96[96]We are aware of three such cases: Eric Sarsfield was convicted of a rape committed 
by a man with a tattoo of a cross on his arm Sarsfield was not tattooed, but police were 
permitted to impeach his trial testimony with a purported admission to police 
interrogators that he sometimes drew tattoos on himself with washable ink. Despite a 
pretrial court order to prosecutors to disclose to the defense all oral statements of the 
stronger remedies to protect the innocent from police error or abuse  In doing so, the 






                                                                                                                                                 
defendant, police did not submit a report of this alleged statement to the prosecutor until 
the week before trial, ten months after the statement was allegedly made. See Brief for 
the Defendant-Appellant at 2, 12-13, 44-46, Commonwealth v. Sarsfield, 406 Mass. 1103 
(1990) (No. 88-P-844). There were similar, eleventh-hour police disclosures in the cases 
of Ella Mae Ellison and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, discussed in Fisher, supra note 1, at 30-31, 
53-56, and 67 nn. 301-303. 
